

Process Calculus Formalization of a Communication Network

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Abstract

Core finance, business resource planning, electronic medical record, telephone exchange, and other similar systems all rely heavily on software. This is true not only in the public sector but also in the commercial sector. Such essential systems should be resilient in addition to being error-free. Software verification and other formally based approaches have historically prioritized accuracy over resilience. In order to formally and analytically assess the resilience of communication methods to Denial-of-Service assaults, Ishigaki et al. suggested a calculus procedure called the Spice calculus. The central concept is a cost-benefit study of communication protocol initiators and receivers. In this article, we detail a novel approach to analysing distributed systems using the Spice calculus and expand the scope of systems intended for study by this tool. As an illustration of our approach, we analyse a telephone communication system. In this article, we demonstrate a novel approach to analysing distributed systems using the Spice calculus and broaden the scope of systems in which it can be applied. As an illustration of our approach, we analyse a telephone communication system. Within the context of the Spice calculus, we defined a basic telephone network based on ISUP of Signalling System No. 7. We then looked at the time and resources it took to create connections and the computations they required.

Keywords:

Process Calculus, Communication Protocol, Telephone Exchange System, Cost Analysis.

Introduction

Software systems play an important role in social infrastructures, and in the public and private sectors, for example in core banking, enterprise resource planning systems, electronic medical record systems, telephone exchange systems, etc. In such fundamental systems, we desire not only correctness with respect to specification requirements but also robustness to cope with unintended situations. Formal methods, such as software verification, have focused on correctness rather than robustness. Many failures have occurred in such IT systems. For example, the core banking system of Mizuho Financial Group, which is the largest banking company in Japan, failed on March 14th 2011 and did not recover until the 23rd, owing to an overload caused by numerous payments of contributions for the Tohoku Earthquake[7]. Such lengthy failures of computer systems can be mitigated by improvements in system robustness. Formal methods, such as software verification, have focused on correctness rather than robustness. Spice calculus [9], which was proposed by Nishizaki et al., is a calculus process which enables

us to formalize and analyze the resistance of communication protocols against Denial-of-Service attacks, based on Milner's picalculus [6]. The key idea of the analysis is analysing costs of initiators and responders in communication protocols. Vulnerability to Denial-of-Service attacks is caused by lack of balance between an initiator and a responder. Cost analysis is important not only for resistance against Denial-of-Service attacks but also for improving a system's robustness to withstanding various unintended situations. In this paper, we therefore apply Spice calculus to analysis of robustness of distributed systems. We conduct a case study using a telephone exchange system, as an example.

Spice calculus

We introduce Spice calculus [9] in this section. In the calculus, there are two categories of expression: one is a set of terms and the other is a set of processes. A term denotes data and a process denotes a series of computational operations which can be executed concurrently. Terms of spice-calculus are defined inductively as follows:

$M, N ::=$	term
n	name
x	variable
i	integer
(M_1, \dots, M_n)	pair

Processes of Spice calculus are defined inductively as follows:

$P, Q, R ::=$	
$\text{out } M \langle N \rangle; P$	message sending
$\text{inp } M (x); P$	message receiving
$(P \mid Q)$	parallel composition
stop	stopping
end	termination
$\text{store } x = M; P$	memory allocation
$\text{free } x; P$	memory deallocation
$\text{match } M \text{ is } N \text{ err } \{R\}; P$	matching
$\text{split } [x_1, \dots, x_n] \text{ is } M \text{ err } \{R\}; P$	pair decomposition
$(P + Q)$	selection

Message sending (out M \tilde{a})
 $\tilde{a} \xrightarrow{M} \tilde{a}$ sends

message N through the port M . Message receiving (in $M(x); P$) receives the message through port M and binds it to the variable x . Parallel decomposition ($P \mid Q$) executes the processes P and Q in parallel. The stopping process stop means an intermediate status on the way to the termination process end. In our computational system, memory allocation and de-allocation are explicitly operated as process ($\text{store } x = M; P$) and ($\text{free } x; P$), respectively. Matching ($\text{match } M \text{ is } N \text{ err } \{P\}; Q$) is a conditional branch: if the values of M and N are equivalent, then P is executed; otherwise, Q is executed. Selection ($P+Q$) is a non-deterministic choice; either P or Q is executed non-deterministically. The type system of Spice calculus is one of its distinctive features, and it enables us to specify the computational cost entailed by each computer node.

$$A \mid (B \mid A) \triangleright P_1 \mid (Q \mid P_2),$$

which describes that the processes P_1 and P_2 are executed on the computer nodes A and Q on B . Types of Spice calculus are defined as follows:

$$A ::= a : \{x_1, \dots, x_n\} \mid (A \mid B)$$

Operational semantics are given to the Spice calculus as transition relation between processes; a computational cost is attached to each step of the transition. For example, this transition means that the processes P and Q are executed in parallel on nodes a and b respectively; the process $(P \oplus Q)$ makes a transition to $(P' \oplus Q')$;

$$(a \mid b) \vdash (P \mid Q) \rightarrow (P' \mid Q') : \{a \cdot 2 \cdot \text{match}, b \cdot \text{store}, \}$$

In this transition, matching and storing operations are done with two match-costs and one store-cost, respectively. The transition relation is defined inductively by several rules (c.f. [9]). The following is one of the reduction rules defining the inner-process computation:

$$\frac{M \downarrow V : c \quad N \downarrow V : d}{(\text{match } M \text{ is } N \text{ err } \{P\}; Q) \triangleright Q : c + d + \text{match}} \text{RedM}$$

If it is assumed that the costs for evaluating M and N are c and d respectively, and both the resulting values of M and N are V , then the expression is transited to Q and the computational cost of the transition is $(c + d + \text{match})$. The rule below is one of the reduction rules defining the inter-process computation:

$$\frac{}{a : \mathcal{V} \vdash \text{inp } n(x); P \xrightarrow{n} (x)P : \{a \cdot \text{store}_x\}} \text{CommIn}$$

This rule means that if the process expression (in $n(x); P$) is executed on computer node a , then memory cost store for a variable x on a . It is transited to an expression $(x)P$, which denotes an intermediate form waiting for the arrival of a message.




Fig. 1. Example of Switched Telephone Network




Fig. 2. Inter-city Call

Formalization of a signalling system using spice calculus

Signalling System No. 7 and ISUP

In this section, we formalize a switched telephone network based on a telephony signalling protocol, Signalling System No. 7 (SS7)[3], using Spice calculus [9]. We focus on an example on a simple switched telephone network which consists of two switches and several telephones. Its network topology is shown in Fig. 1. In SS7, ISDN User Part (ISUP) defines the messages and protocol used in the establishment and tear down of calls over the public switched network, and to manage the trunk network on which they relay. ISUP is depicted as a sequence diagram in Fig. 2. Terminal nodes Phone and Phone are connecting, and intermediate switches Switch A and SwitchB relay the connection. Control messages –iam, acm, ann, rel, and rlc –are defined in ISUP. The messages used are as follows. x IAM (Initial address message), which is the first message sent to inform the partner

$$Subscriber(a, A, B, b) = Sender(a, A, B, b) + Receiver(a, A)$$

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
= out localport(A,A) <("offhook",A); store port = localport(a,A);
inp port (msg);
match msg is "dialtone" err{free msg,port}; free msg;
  out port ("onhook"); stop;
+ out port <("digits",B,b); out port ("onhook"); stop
+ inp port ("msg");
  match msg is "ringtone" err{free msg,port}; free msg;
    out port ("onhook"); stop;
+ inp port (msg);
  match msg is "notone" err{free msg,port}; free msg;
    out port ("onhook"); stop;
+ inp port (msg);
  match msg is "busytone" err{free msg,port}; free msg;
    out port ("onhook"); stop;

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
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= store port = localport(a,A);
  inp port (msg);
  match msg is "check" err{free msg,port}; free msg;
  inp port (msg);
  match msg is "ringtone" err{free msg,port}; free msg;
  (inp port (msg);
    match msg is "notone" err{free msg,port}; free msg; stop;)
+ out port {"offhook"};
  (out port {"onhook"}; stop);
+ inp port ("msg");
  match msg is "busytone" err{free msg,port}; free msg;
  out port {"onhook"}; stop;

```



In Spice calculus, the behaviour of phones (i.e., subscribers) and switches is formalized as processes. The behaviour of a phone a with its partner switch A which has a connection with phone b with its partner switch B , is described as $\text{Subscriber}(a,A,B,b)$, which is divided in two sub-processes, $\text{Sender}(a,A,B,b)$ and $\text{Receiver}(a, A)$:



Here introduces the paper, and add nomenclature, if necessary, in a box with the same font size as the rest of the paper. The paragraphs continue from here and are only separated by headings, subheadings, images and formulae. The section headings are arranged by numbers, and are in bold and 10 pt. Here follows further instructions for authors.

Cost Estimation by Spice Calculus

In this section, we show a cost analysis of a case in which a subscriber a with a partner switch A requests a connection to a subscriber b with a partner switch B. This is simpler than the situation mentioned in Figs. 4 and 5. Subscribers a1, a2 and a3 are simplified into only one subscriber a; b1, b2, and b3 are simplified into b. The behaviour of this case is described as the following process.

Sender(a,A,B,b) | Switch(A) | Switch(B) | Receiver(b,B).

By reducing the process described the system; we can see not only the computational result but also the total cost.

Sender(a,A,B,b) | Switch(A) | Switch(B) | Receiver(b,B)
 \gg *Sender(a,A,B,b) | LocalSwitch(A) | RemoteSwitch(B) | Receiver(b,B)*
 \rightarrow (out port ((“digs”.B,b));...) | (inp localport (msg);...)
 | RemoteSwitch(B) | Receiver(b,B)
 : {a · (store + makeport + match), A · (3store + makeport + match)}
 Let port be port_a and localport port_a below.
 \rightarrow (inp port_a (msg);...) | (out ... ((“iam”,...));...)
 | RemoteSwitch(B) | Receiver(b,B)
 : {A · (2store + makeport + 3match)}
 \rightarrow ... | (inp localport (“check”);...)
 | (out localport ((“check”,...));...) | Receiver(b,B)
 : {A · (2store + makeport + 3match)}
 \rightarrow ... | (inp localport (“check”);...)
 | (out localport ((“check”,...));...) | Receiver(b,B)
 : {A · (2store + makeport + 3match)}
 \rightarrow ... | ...
 | (out localport (“check”;...)) | (inp port (msg);...)
 : {b · (store + makeport)}
 Let port be port_b and localport port_b below.
 \rightarrow ... | (inp remoteport (msg);...)
 | (out localport (“acm”;...)) | (inp port_b (msg);...)
 : {b · match}
 \rightarrow (inp port_a (msg);...) | (out port_a (“ringtone”;...))
 | (out port_b (“ringtone”;...)) | ...
 : {A · 2match}

\rightarrow ... | (inp remoteport (msg);...)
 | (inp port_b (msg);...) | (out port_b (“offhook”;...))
 : {b · match}
 \rightarrow ... | (inp remoteport (msg);...)
 | (out port_b (“iam”;...)) | (...session started...)
 : {B · match}
 \rightarrow ((inp port_a (msg);...) | (out port_a (“action”;...))
 | (...session started...)) | (...session started...)
 : {A · match}
 \rightarrow (...session started... | (...session started... | (...session started... | (...session started...))
 : {a · match}

Summing up the costs attached to each transition step, we can see the total computation cost is as follows:

{ a · (store + makeport + 3 match),
 A · (2 store + 3 makeport + 7 match),
 B · (2 store + 2 makeport + 2 match),
 a · (store + makeport + 2 match)}

Related Works

Protocol verification has been studied for the last decade using several kinds of framework. For example, Bruns et al. [1] studied the MSMIE protocol, which allows processors in a distributed system to communicate via shared memory. They provided a formal model of the MSMIE protocol in Milner's CCS and analysed the formal model using an automated verification tool, the Concurrency Workbench. Quantitative analysis of communication and secure protocols was studied by one of the authors [9], but also by Cervelat [2], which enables evaluation of protocol resilience to various forms of denial of service, guessing attacks, and resource limitation using the MSR (Multi-Set Rewriting) specification language. Liu et al. [5] formalized and verified in the framework of a coloured petri net the capability exchange signalling (CES) protocol, which is a sub-protocol of the H.245 control protocol for multimedia communication.

Conclusion

Due to the time and labour-intensive nature of human Appraisal labelling, there are not many such datasets accessible. While sentiment analysis has made great strides in determining a text's overarching meaning slant, the Attitude Appraisal component is still holding out. In order to pinpoint the source of the issues and offer suggestions for how to fix them, a simple automated recognizer

was developed and tried for this research. No distinction is made between authorial and non-authorial assessment; the focus is solely on written Appraisal.

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